Existing DoS attack detection tools are unable to detect Low rate DoS (LDoS) attacks. Many researchers have proposed mechanisms to detect LdoS attack. But they require modifications to the existing infrastructure or protocols which is not practical. There should be a lightweight mechanism which could be integrated with existing Intrusion Detection Systems. This paper proposes a lightweight software-based approach for LdoS detection which could be integrated with existing Intrusion detection system and does not require any change in existing infrastructure and protocol.Experimental results are provided to support the effectiveness and efficiency of proposed mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Most DoS detection tools anticipate large number of incoming packets to identify them as DoS attack.So the attackers have started exploiting various factors and vulnerabilities that vary from iterative servers [11] to fixed minimum RTO property of TCP. In this new kind of attack called shrew attack or low rate TCP attack, attacker sends packets at a low rate such that the standard tools cannot detect them.TCP is widely used, so a solution requiring changes to TCP and widespread modifications of users' software may not be practical. This motivates us to consider a software based approach that can be implemented in a resilient routing infrastructure benefitting a large community of standard TCP users. The attacker ensures periodic overflow of a router's buffer, a basic signature of attack traffic will be intermittent short bursts of high rate traffic in between periods of little or no activity. In practice, however, attack traffic can deviate from the basic signature.Moreover, in a distributed attack, the traffic from individual attack sources may not have the expected traffic characteristics, but the aggregation of such traffic does. Therefore, it is essential to develop detection algorithms using time based network traffic features that are both robust to practical traffic distortions and efficient to carry out even at a busy router. [1] Section 2 of this paper describes the current LDoS attack detection schemes .Section 3 is the proposed mechanism. Section 4 describes the experimental setup and the results obtained. Section 5 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
The researchers have proposed detection methods which require modification to the existing systems or protocol. Amey and Ansari [8] added an extra module which monitors the flow and filters the malicious objects based on comparison with standard objects stored in memory. [9] Suggests RTO randomisation to confuse the attacker and avoid a low rate DoS attack. Some researchers have focussed on the buffer of the router and queue management algorithms to detect low rate DoS attacks.Sandeep and Terz [7] suggested increase in the buffer size so that the attacker has to send packets at higher rates to fill up the target buffer which would then cease to be a low rate DoS Attack. In [6] two parameters are considered, one is packet percentage at the cache queue of a target router, and another is the threshold percentage which is calculated on the basis of the number of packets of client as well as the number of packets of the attacker. [5] Proposes a mechanism called HAWK (halting anomaly with weighted choking) which focusses is on dropping algorithms for detection of DoS flows and achieving fairness among adaptive and non adaptive flows. Jin and Shin [2] use an IP to hop-count (IP2HC) mapping table to detect and discard spoofed IP packets. Rodriguez, Briones and Nolazco [3] have applied fuzzy logic on the Hop count mechanism to make it more accurate in terms of finding out the packet arrival timeseries data; Hubei [10] discovered that most of the attacks are of self-similar in nature so if we study the patterns then large scale attacks could be mitigated to a certain extent. But John and David propose a Dynamic Detection mechanism [1] not based on the traffic pattern but gets back to the source.Here the attack port is identified and the path of attack is backtracked to detect the source of the attack. PAD [4] which relies on the nearperiodic nature of the traffic is slower than MAD which operates on the sampled time-series. We require mechanism that would be integrated to the intrusion detection systems and should be easily deployable.
PROPOSED MECHANISM
LDoS attacker periodically sends data bursts to overflow the buffer of Router. Thus the Time-based network traffic features can be used to detect LdoS attacks effectively. Parameters used in proposed mechanism are listed in Table 4 .1. All parameters listed in table except α, β, γ, Th Discard , TS duration are time-based parameters.Based on the formula to determine the retransmission timeout for TCP connections [12] we derive the formulas to calculate Average Traffic, Average Packet interarrival time which are listed below: Using the above calculated parameters, Thread 2 uses the following algorithm to detect an LdoS attack.
Algorithm

Input: Network traffic Data
Output: Detection of LdoS attack
Step Step 4: Suspend thread processing till the end of current time slot interval
After calculating these parameters the average traffic per timeslot is compared with traffic in the current time slot. When the traffic in current time slot TS Traffic exceeds (1+ β) times the average traffic per time slot (TS ATraffic ) then we proceed further.Next we check the number of timeouts in that timeslot and the number of discarded packets.When the timeouts are twice the total number of connections and the number of discarded packets exceed the set threshold level we proceed further.Next we compare the average inter-arrival time along with the inter-arrival time in current timeslot.When we confirm that the interarrival time has reduced we conclude that it is not congestion but we are under an LdoS attack.If any of the steps fail then the thread processing is suspended for that time slot.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP & RESULTS
Experimental setup is as shown in figure 2 . Configuration of Server machine is; Intel Core2 Duo 1. Values of α, β, γ and Th Discard used for experiment are 0.75, 0.30, 0.70, 1000 respectively. Experimental test is divided into two phases. In first phase clients sets up the connection with server. Server has a pool of files and it transfers these files to clients on demand. Network traffic Data and server performance data is collected during this phase and graphical representation of this data is shown in Fig 2. RTO is plotted versus the number of discarded packets, in an attackfree environment, from the figure we can see that the number of timeouts and the number of discarded packets are quite less (almost zero). The average traffic does not increase and the Interarrival time is evenly spread across that particular timeslot.It means that the file requested is sent and the overall bandwidth utilisation does not increase rapidly. In second phase; attack machines are used to launch low rate DoS attack against server. The process followed by attack machines is described below:
Step 1: Send 100 spoofed packets to server
Step 2: Wait for 5 seconds
Step 3: Goto back to step 1 Network traffic data and server performance data collected during this phase is analyzed graphically to support efficiency and effectiveness and proposed mechanism.
Fig 2: RTO versus Discarded packets
From Fig 3: we can observe that as soon as the attack starts the traffic per time slot increases and the average traffic exceeds the current traffic in timeslot.Then watchout for the timeouts . Fig 4: clearly shows that the number of timeouts it is twice the number of connections to the server (connections made were 3 here timeouts are 6).Also the number of packets discarded has exceeded the Threshold limit (Here above 600).Now we have to observe the Interarrival time of the incoming packets. Fig 5: we can observe that the average interarrival time has reduced drastically and is much less than the packet interarrival time in that time slot.hence we can conclude that it is a low rate DoS attack. 
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a lightweight and efficient software-based detection scheme against low rate TCP DoS attacks. This mechanism has been able to address and overcome some of the challenges and issues faced by other detection mechanisms which are mentioned below:
Can be integrated to intrusion detection system: No Modification to the existing routers.
Can be deployed without any extra cost: the delay and cost factor poses serious problems to implement other mechanisms in a global perspective. Robust to changes in the transport-layer headers: Most of the detection approaches perform analysis based on packet contents rather than packet inter-arrival times. 
